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JOE CAMEL VERSUS UNCLE SAM:  
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GRAPHIC 
CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS 
B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr.* 
 
According to the Surgeon General, tobacco use is the leading 
preventable cause of death in the United States.  Smoking-related diseases 
kill 443,000 Americans each year, more than are killed by HIV, illegal drug 
use, alcohol use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides, and murders combined.  
To address this public health threat, Congress enacted the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in 2009, which gave the federal 
government unprecedented power to regulate the tobacco industry.  Among 
its provisions, the TCA requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to 
select images that depict smoking’s deleterious effects and compels tobacco 
companies to display the images, accompanied by a textual warning, on 
half of the front and rear panels of every cigarette package.  This new 
graphic format—the first alteration of cigarette package warnings in over 
twenty-five years—represents a significant and aggressive change in the 
way that the government communicates the dangers of smoking to the 
public. 
To prevent the introduction of these new labels into the marketplace, the 
tobacco industry has filed suit alleging that the graphic warnings infringe 
on its First Amendment right to refrain from speaking.  The two circuit 
courts that have considered this issue are divided sharply over the labels’ 
constitutionality and the appropriate framework for assessing them.  This 
Note examines this legal fissure and argues that the warnings should be 
examined under the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.  Ultimately, 
this Note contends that the labels do not pass muster under this intense 
level of scrutiny and are thus unconstitutional compulsions of speech. 
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 “To cease smoking is the easiest thing I ever did.  I ought to know 
because I’ve done it a thousand times.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the convenience store, the cigarette packages are in their usual location 
behind the counter.  A smoker, you approach the cashier and ask for your 
brand of choice.  She passes you a pack, which you take without much 
thought.  In your hands it feels like it always has, the same familiar size and 
weight.  But as you fetch your wallet to pay for it, something about its label 
catches your eye:  it is significantly different than what you have grown 
accustomed to.  The name and logo of the brand are still there, but covering 
half of the package is a color photo of a man smoking a cigarette through a 
hole in his throat.  Accompanying this disturbing image are the words 
“WARNING:  Cigarettes are addictive.”  Surprised, you strain to see the 
other packages behind the counter; they too, you notice, follow this new 
labeling scheme.  You look back down at the package and for a few beats 
consider the gruesome image and its textual admonition.  You are now 
faced with a choice:  do you buy the cigarettes and eventually smoke them, 
or do you leave the package at the counter and exit the store? 
Consumers of cigarettes in the United States may soon be asking 
themselves this and similar questions as a result of the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act2 (TCA).  Among its provisions, the 
 
 1. See READER’S DIG., Dec. 1945, at 26 (attributing the quotation to Mark Twain); see 
also Bayard T. Horton, The Outlook in Thrombo-Angiitis Obliterans, 111 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2184, 2188 (1938) (same).  The origin of this quotation is disputed.  
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 
and 21 U.S.C.). 
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TCA requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to select 
images that depict smoking’s deleterious effects and compels tobacco 
companies to display the images, accompanied by a textual warning, on half 
of the front and rear panels of every cigarette package.3  This new graphic 
format, the first alteration of cigarette package warnings in over twenty-five 
years,4 represents a significant and aggressive change in the way that the 
government communicates the dangers of smoking to the public. 
To prevent the introduction of these new labels into the marketplace, the 
tobacco industry has filed suit in two federal courts, alleging that the 
graphic warnings infringe on its First Amendment right to refrain from 
speaking.  Consequently, the rollout of the new labels, originally slated for 
September 2012,5 is now uncertain.  In limbo, too, is the appropriate 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of this regulation and the 
extent to which the government can warn the public about the dangers of 
smoking and other activities deemed harmful or unhealthy. 
In 2012, two circuits considered this issue and divided sharply over the 
labels’ constitutionality and the appropriate framework for assessing them.  
The Sixth Circuit determined that the labels were subject to strict scrutiny 
unless an exemption—namely, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, providing for rational basis 
review of disclosures meant to correct potentially misleading commercial 
speech6—applied.7  The court found that, because the labels disclose factual 
information, such an exemption did apply.8  The court then reviewed the 
labeling requirement using the Zauderer rational basis standard and found 
that the provision satisfied this test.9  For this reason, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the labeling requirement did not violate the First Amendment.10 
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit determined that the labels were subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Service Commission11 unless the Zauderer exception applied.12  The court 
found that the labels did not correct potentially misleading speech and thus 
found Zauderer inapplicable.13  After examining the images using 
intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the labels did not satisfy this 
 
 3. See id. § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333); see also infra Part I.A.2–3. 
 4. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (noting that Congress last altered 
cigarette warning labels in 1984). 
 5. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
36,628, 36,628 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Final Rule] (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) 
(“This rule is effective September 22, 2012.”). 
 6. 471 U.S. 626 (1985); see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing the Zauderer standard). 
 7. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 8. See id. at 558. 
 9. See id. at 561–69. 
 10. See id. at 569. 
 11. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also infra Part I.B.3 (detailing the Central Hudson 
standard). 
 12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 13. See id. at 1215–17. 
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standard.14  Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that the labels violated the 
First Amendment.15 
Adding to the confusion, although each circuit court upheld the judgment 
of its respective trial court,16 each employed a different level of scrutiny 
than its district court.17  Further, neither circuit court decision was 
unanimous.18 
This Note analyzes this legal fissure.  It focuses on identifying and 
applying the appropriate framework for assessing the graphic warning 
labels’ constitutional fitness.  It concludes that the warnings should be 
examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies.  
Moreover, it argues that the graphic warning labels do not correct 
potentially misleading speech as defined by Zauderer and its progeny, that 
Zauderer does not apply, and that strict scrutiny does.  This Note concludes 
that, under this intense level of scrutiny, the cigarette labels proposed by the 
FDA do not pass muster and are therefore unconstitutional compulsions of 
speech. 
Part I of this Note first examines the federal government’s attempts to 
educate the public about smoking through package warning labels and then 
reviews the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence.  Part II describes 
the different frameworks that the Sixth and D.C. Circuits and the district 
courts used to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and the 
application of their chosen scrutiny.  Part III contends that strict scrutiny 
should apply unless Zauderer does, that Zauderer does not apply and thus 
strict scrutiny does, and that the regulation is unconstitutional when 
subjected to this review. 
I.  CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS AND THE RIGHT (NOT) TO SPEAK 
The litigation over the TCA’s labeling requirement sits at the intersection 
of public health policy and freedom of expression.  In order to fully 
appreciate the split in the circuit courts, it is necessary to understand the 
government’s history of requiring warning labels on cigarette packages, the 
new format mandated by the TCA, and the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Accordingly, this part sets forth this context, 
with Part I.A tracing the government’s attempts to educate consumers about 
 
 14. See id. at 1217–22. 
 15. See id. at 1221–22. 
 16. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Western District of Kentucky’s opinion in 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010)); infra 
Part II.B.1 (examining the District Court for the District of Columbia’s judgment in R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012)). 
 17. The court in Commonwealth Brands used the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny 
standard to analyze the provision’s First Amendment constitutionality. See infra notes 248–
50 and accompanying text.  The district court in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco examined the 
provision under strict scrutiny. See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part II.A.2–3 (detailing the majority and dissenting opinions in the Sixth 
Circuit decision); infra Part II.B.2–3 (exploring the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
D.C. Circuit judgment). 
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the health consequences of smoking through warning labels on cigarette 
packages, the TCA’s graphic warning labeling requirement, and the FDA’s 
implementation of that provision.  Part I.B surveys the speech—and 
silence—that the First Amendment protects, focusing in particular on the 
Supreme Court’s compelled and commercial speech doctrines and its 
treatment of factual disclosures. 
A.  Cigarette Warning Labels:  The Government Attempts To Inform the 
Public About the Dangers of Smoking 
The adverse effects of cigarette smoking are considerable.19  According 
to the Surgeon General, tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of 
death in the United States.20  Smoking-related diseases21 kill 443,000 
Americans each year,22 more than are killed by HIV, illegal drug use, 
alcohol use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides, and murders combined.23  The 
economic losses stemming from tobacco use are also staggering:  in the 
United States alone, smoking accounts annually for over $193 billion in lost 
productivity and health care expenditures.24  These considerable health and 
financial costs contrast with the billions of dollars in profits made each year 
 
 19. The Surgeon General has concluded that “[s]moking harms nearly every organ of the 
body, causing many diseases and reducing the health of smokers in general.” See U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:  A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 25 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2004/complete_report/index.htm (click on 
“Chapter 1”); see also Smoking & Tobacco Use:  Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_
sheets/health_effects/effects_cig_smoking/index.htm (last updated Jan. 10, 2012). 
 20. See 2004 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 30. 
 21. Cigarette smoking is causally linked with twenty-nine medical conditions, such as 
coronary heart disease and at least ten types of cancers. See, e.g., id. at 4–8 tbl.1.1; Smoking 
& Tobacco Use, supra note 19. 
 22. Smoking-related diseases cause nearly one of every five deaths in the United States. 
See Smoking & Tobacco Use, supra note 19; see also Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years 
of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1226, 1226–28 (2008) (categorizing the 443,000 annual smoking-
related deaths by cause).  This figure includes those affected indirectly by smoking, such as 
victims of secondhand exposure to tobacco smoke. See id. 
 23. See Smoking & Tobacco Use, supra note 19. 
 24. During 2000–2004, cigarette smoking was estimated to be responsible for nearly $96 
billion in direct medical costs and an additional $97 billion in lost productivity, a total of 
$193 billion. See Smoking & Tobacco Use:  Economic Facts About U.S. Tobacco Production 
and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_
statistics/fact_sheets/economics/econ_facts/index.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2012). 
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by the tobacco industry25 and the billions of dollars spent by that industry 
annually on advertising and other promotions.26 
To address this public health threat and to counteract the tobacco 
industry’s financial and advertising strength, the federal government has 
implemented a number of regulatory and legislative initiatives, including 
mandating the placement of warning labels on every pack of cigarettes.  
This section outlines the history of the government’s response, the TCA’s 
graphic labeling scheme, and the images chosen by the FDA to appear on 
future cigarette labels. 
1.  Like “Bringing a Butter Knife to a Gun Fight”27:  Cigarette Warning 
Labels Before the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
Although physicians had suspected a connection between smoking and 
disease for centuries,28 the first medical studies confirming that link did not 
appear until the 1920s.29  In the years following these initial studies, 
thousands of laboratory, autopsy, and epidemiologic studies examined the 
relationship between tobacco use and disease.30  With the evidence 
mounting, the Surgeon General convened an advisory committee to 
examine the issue in 1962.31  The committee’s report, issued in 1964, 
concluded that cigarette smoking caused disease32 and death.33  In response, 
 
 25. Altria Group, the parent company of Philip Morris USA, the United States’ largest 
tobacco company, reported earnings of almost $3.6 billion in 2011. See ALTRIA 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 92 (2011), available at https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/02209S/
20120323/AR_120342/.  The top six global tobacco companies made an estimated $500 
billion in revenues and $35.1 billion in profits in 2011. See Simon Bowers, Global Profits 
for Tobacco Trade Total $35bn As Smoking Deaths Top 6 Million, GUARDIAN (March 21, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/22/tobacco-profits-deaths-6-million. 
 26. In 2006, cigarette companies spent $12.4 billion on advertising and promotional 
expenses in the United States alone. See Smoking & Tobacco Use:  Tobacco Industry 
Marketing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_
statistics/fact_sheets/tobacco_industry/marketing/index.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2011). 
 27. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[The] 
FDA lament[s] that their previous efforts to combat the tobacco companies’ advertising 
campaigns have been like bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.”). 
 28. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:  25 YEARS OF PROGRESS—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL 5 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], available at http://profiles
.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBXS.pdf; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 
513–15 (1992) (summarizing the early scientific research on tobacco and the government’s 
initial responses to educating the public of the ill-effects of its use). 
 29. See, e.g., A.C. Broders, Squamous-Cell Epithelioma of the Lip:  A Study of Five 
Hundred and Thirty-Seven Cases, 74 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 656 (1920) (linking tobacco use to 
lip cancer); Herbert Lombard & Carl Doering, Cancer Studies in Massachusetts:  Habits, 
Characteristics and Environment of Individuals with and Without Cancer, 198 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 481, 485–87 (1928) (noting that heavy smoking was more common among cancer 
patients than among control groups). 
 30. See generally 1989 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 28. 
 31. See id. at 6. 
 32. See id. at 7. 
 33. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH:  REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC 
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the Surgeon General declared cigarette smoking to be a significant health 
hazard in need of immediate attention.34 
Reacting to the Surgeon General’s findings, Congress enacted the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act35 (FCLAA) in 1965.36  The 
FCLAA gave the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate 
cigarette labels37 and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the 
authority to regulate tobacco advertising on radio and television.38  The new 
law also delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to regulate other aspect of the tobacco 
industry.39  Finally, the FCLAA required tobacco companies to display a 
textual warning in “a conspicuous place” on all cigarette packages starting 
in 1966.40  This warning read:  “Caution:  Cigarette Smoking May Be 
Hazardous to Your Health.”41  With the introduction of this warning, the 
United States became the first country to mandate a warning label on 
cigarette packages.42 
Since the appearance of this initial warning in 1966, Congress has twice 
modified the wording of the required warning.  In 1970, the Public Health 
 
HEALTH SERVICE 31 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf 
(“In view of the continuing and mounting evidence from many sources, it is the judgment of 
the Committee that cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain 
specific diseases and to the overall death rate.”). 
 34. See id. at 33 (“Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the 
United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1341 (2006)); see also President Signs Cigarettes Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1965, at 17 
(reporting on President Lyndon Johnson’s signing of the FCLAA). 
 36. Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938. See 
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 
(2006)).  The FDCA authorized the FDA to regulate food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. See 
21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006) (establishing the contours of the FDA’s authority by clearly 
identifying food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices as subject to FDA regulation).  Tobacco 
products were not included in this original grant of authority. See id.  In 1965, the House 
passed, and later withdrew, a bill that would have placed tobacco within the FDA’s 
regulatory jurisdiction by expanding the FDCA. See Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not 
Regulate Tobacco Products As “Drugs” or As “Medical Devices,” 47 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1079 
(1998).  Professor Richard A. Merrill characterizes this withdrawal and the subsequent 
passage of the FCLAA as a congressional “compromise,” a “‘deal’ struck in Congress” that 
excluded the FDA “from any role in federal [decision making] about the health effects of 
tobacco use.” Id. at 1079–80. 
 37. See FCLAA § 5. 
 38. See Jennifer Costello, Comment, The FDA’s Struggle To Regulate Tobacco, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 671, 677 n.32 (1997) (explaining the FCC’s initial regulatory role). 
 39. See id. at 678 n.42 (describing the IRS’s role in taxing tobacco sales, the USDA’s 
regulation of tobacco farming, and the ATF’s task of fighting illegal tobacco sales and 
distribution). 
 40. See FCLAA § 4.  The FCLAA did not specify the size, color, or position of the 
warning on package, leaving these details to the discretion of the cigarette industry. See 
President Signs Cigarettes Bill, supra note 35. 
 41. See FCLAA § 4. 
 42. See Duff Wilson, U.S. Selects Cigarette Warning Images, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2011, at B1 (noting this milestone). 
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Cigarette Smoking Act43 (PHCSA) amended the warning to include an 
admonition from the Surgeon General and stronger language:  “Warning:  
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is 
Dangerous to Your Health.”44  In 1984, the Comprehensive Smoking 
Education Act45 (CSEA) introduced four new warnings to be placed on all 
tobacco products and to be rotated on a quarterly basis for each brand.46  
These warnings are: 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, 
Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy” 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Quitting Smoking Now Greatly 
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health” 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Smoking By Pregnant Women 
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight” 
“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING:  Cigarette Smoke Contains 
Carbon Monoxide.”47 
These 1984 warnings remain emblazoned on cigarette packages and were to 
be modified by the TCA’s graphic labels.48 
2.  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
Since the introduction of warnings labels on cigarette packages in 1965, 
the rate of smoking among adults in America has decreased from 
approximately 42 percent49 to approximately 19 percent in 2011,50 due in 
large part to the increasing awareness that cigarette smoking is harmful.51  
 
 43. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1340 (2006)). 
 44. See id. § 4. The PHCSA also banned television and radio advertisements for tobacco 
products. See id. § 6. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331–1340 (2006)). 
 46. Id. § 4(c). See generally Ronald M. Davis et al., The Rotation of Health Warnings in 
Cigarette Advertisements:  Compliance with the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 
1984, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 403 (1988) (describing the warning label rotation system 
introduced by the CSEA and its increased efficacy). 
 47. CSEA § 4. 
 48. Kristin M. Sempeles, Note, The FDA’s Attempt To Scare the Smoke Out of You:  
Has the FDA Gone Too Far with the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 223, 223 n.3 (2012); see also Gary Strauss, Graphic Cigarette Labels, Will They 
Work?, USA TODAY (June 22, 2011, 12:58 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
health/story/health/story/2011/06/FDA-issues-graphic-cigarette-labels/48676990/1 (noting 
that “[t]he images are the biggest change to cigarette warning labels since 1984”). 
 49. See Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2006, 56 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1157, 1161 fig.1 (2007) (illustrating the smoking prevalence rate 
among adults in the United States between 1965 and 2006). 
 50. See Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2011, 61 MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 889, 892 (2012). 
 51. In addition to increased awareness of smoking’s health consequences, smoke-free 
buildings, price increases by tobacco companies, and excise taxes have also played a role in 
decreasing the prevalence of smoking. See Dennis Cauchon, Tax Hike Cuts Tobacco 
Consumption, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/
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Recently, however, this downward trend has leveled off, hovering around 
20 percent for the past five years.52  Among other reasons, this can be 
attributed to two factors.  First, each day thousands of young people try 
cigarettes for the first time and many become regular smokers.53  Second, 
research indicates that the textual labels are ineffective54 because they are 
easily overlooked55 and require a college reading level, thus making them 
inappropriate for youth, those with poor reading abilities and low levels of 
education, and non-English speakers.56 
On June 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the TCA,57 
the most sweeping federal tobacco legislation in over twenty-five years.58  
Rebutting Congress’s original denial of FDA jurisdiction over tobacco 
regulation and the Agency’s unsuccessful attempt to regulate tobacco 
 
story/2012-09-10/cigarette-tax-smoking/57737774/1 (reporting that a 22 percent increase of 
the federal cigarette tax in 2009 led three million people to stop smoking in 2010 and 
mentioning other possible causes for the decrease). See generally Serginio Sylvain, The 
Effects of Excise Tax on Cigarette Consumption:  A Divergence in the Behavior of Youth and 
Adults, 1 MICH. J. BUS. 87 (2008) (arguing that the percentage of adult smokers does not 
change with taxation whereas the percentage of underage smokers decreases significantly 
when excise taxes on cigarettes increase). 
 52. See Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2011, supra note 50, 
at 889–94. 
 53. The government estimates that 4,000 young people between the ages twelve and 
seventeen try their first cigarette each day. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
TOBACCO USE AND THE HEALTH OF YOUNG PEOPLE (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
HealthyYouth/tobacco/pdf/tobacco_factsheet.pdf. 
 54. See generally Bethany K. Dumas, Adequacy of Cigarette Package Warnings:  An 
Analysis of the Adequacy of Federally Mandated Cigarette Package Warnings, 59 TENN. L. 
REV. 261 (1992) (analyzing the linguistic and psychological effect of the rotational textual 
warnings and questioning their adequacy and effectiveness). But see Davis et al., supra note 
46 (examining the increased efficacy that resulted from the introduction of the CSEA’s 
labeling regime). 
 55. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM:  A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (2007) [hereinafter INST. OF MED. REPORT], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11795 (reporting that since the introduction of 
the 1984 warning labels, “evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of the prescribed warnings 
has continued to accumulate,” supporting the conclusion that these warnings “are unnoticed 
and stale, and they fail to convey relevant information in an effective way”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH & TOBACCO:  PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG 
PEOPLE—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 167–69 (1995), available at 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCLQ.pdf (detailing the numerous empirical studies 
regarding the ineffectiveness of warning labels and concluding that these studies show that 
the 1984 labels are easily overlooked). 
 56. INST. OF MED. REPORT, supra note 55, at 437. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 
and 21 U.S.C.); see also Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15 (discussing President Barack Obama’s signing of the TCA into 
law and his smoking habit). 
 58. See Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2009, at A1 (characterizing the TCA as “the first big federal step against smoking 
since the 1971 ban against tobacco advertising on television and radio and the 1988 rules 
against smoking on airline flights—but potentially much more sweeping than either of those 
moves”). 
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products in 1996,59 the TCA gives the FDA exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate the tobacco industry.60  In exchange, however, the TCA prohibits 
the FDA from banning the sale of tobacco or mandating the elimination of 
nicotine from cigarettes.61  Among other provisions, the TCA affects the 
ability of tobacco companies to sell and market their products.62  These 
limitations include restricting the marketing of “modified risk tobacco 
products,”63 outlawing claims that a tobacco product is safe or safer as a 
result of FDA regulation;64 prohibiting color and imagery in tobacco 
 
 59. In 1996, the FDA unsuccessfully attempted to regulate the tobacco products under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). See Regulations Restricting the Sale 
and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 
61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,615–18 (Aug. 28, 1996).  The FDCA prohibits any misbranded 
food, drug, or device from entering into interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).  
After extensive fact-finding, the FDA determined that nicotine was a “drug” and cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco were “devices” that deliver nicotine to the body within the meaning 
of the FDCA, and thus tobacco products were within its regulatory purview. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(h)(2)–(3) (defining a “device” as having an “intended” effect on the structure or 
function of the body or an “intended” use in the cure or prevention of disease).  Tobacco 
companies objected, and the Supreme Court addressed the issue in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  Applying the two-step executive statutory 
interpretation test introduced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court held that the FDA’s attempted regulation exceeded its 
authority. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132–33. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
 61. Id. § 387g(d)(3) (restricting the FDA’s authority to reduce nicotine levels to zero or 
to ban tobacco products). 
 62. The TCA’s advertising and marketing provisions may address the perceived 
shortcomings of the $206 billion “master settlement” agreement reached between seven 
tobacco companies and forty-six states in 1998. See Wilson, supra note 58.  That agreement 
resolved lawsuits and banned a number of the industry’s marketing practices, including the 
use of cartoons in advertisements and advertising on billboards and public transportation, in 
sports stadiums, shopping malls, and video game arcades. See Master Settlement Agreement, 
NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., § III(b)–(d) (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.naag.org/backpages/
naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf.  In the 
years since the settlement’s signing and the implementation of these industry-imposed 
sanctions, tobacco companies have nearly doubled their marketing spending and increased 
their advertising in stores, an advertising space not addressed by the agreement. See Wilson, 
supra note 58. 
 63. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101(b), 123 Stat. 1776, 1784 (2009) (codified in scattered 
sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.) (amending the FDCA to add § 911(b)(2)(A)) (prohibiting 
(1) “the label, labeling, or advertising” of a tobacco product from “explicitly or implicitly” 
suggesting that the product is less harmful than other tobacco products, and (2) a “tobacco 
product manufacturer” from taking “any action directed to consumers through the media or 
otherwise . . . respecting the product that would be reasonably expected to result in 
consumers believing that the tobacco product or its smoke may” be less harmful than other 
tobacco products, without prior FDA approval of the product as “modified risk”). 
 64. See id. §§ 103(b), 301(tt) (amending the FDCA to add § 331(tt)) (prohibiting 
tobacco companies from making “any express or implied statement or representation 
directed to consumers . . . through the media or advertising” that “conveys, or misleads or 
would mislead consumers into believing, that (1) the product is approved by the [FDA]; 
(2) the [FDA] deems the product to be safe for use by consumers; (3) the product is endorsed 
by the [FDA] for use by consumers; or (4) the product is safe or less harmful by virtue of 
[either] its regulation or inspection by the [FDA]; or its compliance with regulatory 
requirements set by the [FDA]”). 
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advertising;65 and banning event sponsorship,66 the branding of nontobacco 
merchandise,67 and the distribution of free sample cigarettes.68 
The TCA also mandates a new, three-element warning label that replaces 
the previous labeling format.  First, the TCA requires all cigarette packages 
to bear one of the following nine textual warnings: 
“Cigarettes are addictive” 
“Tobacco smoke can harm your children” 
“Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease” 
“Cigarettes cause cancer” 
“Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease” 
“Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby” 
“Smoking can kill you” 
“Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers” 
“Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health.”69 
Second, the TCA specifies that the labels “shall comprise the top 50 percent 
of the front and rear panels of the package” and that the word “WARNING” 
should appear in capital letters in seventeen-point font.70  Third, the TCA 
requires “color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of 
smoking” to accompany the textual warnings.71  The FDA states that the 
purpose of these new graphic labels is to convey information about the 
 
 65. Section 102(a)(2) requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
promulgate a regulation that “shall be identical in its provisions to part 897 of the regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary . . . in the August 28, 1996, issue of the Federal Register (61 
Fed. Reg. 44,615–18).” Id. § 102(a)(2).  Section 897.32(a) of those regulations prohibits 
every “manufacturer, distributor, and retailer” of tobacco products from “advertising, . . . 
disseminating or causing to be disseminated, any labeling or advertising for cigarettes or 
smokeless tobacco” unless such labeling or advertising consists of “only black text on a 
white background.” 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617, § 897.32(a) (Aug. 28, 1996). 
 66. See TCA § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,615–18, § 897.34(c)) (prohibiting 
any “manufacturer, distributor, or retailer” of tobacco products from “sponsor[ing] or 
caus[ing] to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or 
any entry or team in any event, in the brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message, 
recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical 
or similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless 
tobacco”)). 
 67. See id. § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617, § 897.34(a)) (prohibiting any 
manufacturer of tobacco products from marketing, distributing, or selling any promotional 
item bearing the “brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message, [or] recognizable 
color or pattern of colors” of any tobacco product brand)). 
 68. See id. § 102(a)(1), (a)(2)(G) (adopting and amending 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616–17, 
§ 897.16(d)) (prohibiting any “manufacturer, distributor, or retailer” of “cigarettes, 
smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products” from “distribut[ing] or caus[ing] to be 
distributed any free samples of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco.”)). 
 69. Id. § 201 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
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negative health consequences of smoking to consumers and to decrease 
smoking rates.72 
3.  The FDA Selects the Nine Images 
Pursuant to the TCA, the FDA issued a proposed rule on November 12, 
201073 and sought comment on thirty-six potential images to accompany 
the nine textual warnings.74  During the comment period that followed, the 
FDA received, reviewed, and responded to over 1,700 comments.75  Also, 
the FDA commissioned an 18,000-person, internet-based consumer study to 
research the efficacy of the thirty-six proposed images.76  Finally, the FDA 
considered empirical evidence from research studies that explored the 
efficacy of the graphic warning labels already in place in Australia and 
Canada.77  Based on this evidence, the FDA selected nine images and 
promulgated a final rule on June 22, 2011.78 
The graphics chosen by the FDA to appear on cigarette labeling include 
photos of (1) a man smoking a cigarette through a tracheotomy; 
(2) diseased lungs; (3) a mouth with stained teeth and an open sore; (4) a 
cadaver with chest staples laying on an autopsy table; (5) a woman crying; 
(6) a man wearing a T-shirt with the words “I Quit” on it; (7) a baby and an 
adult, presumably a parent, surrounded by curling cigarette smoke; (8) a 
patient hooked up to an oxygen mask; and (9) a drawing of a crying 
newborn in an incubator.79  Additionally, the final rule requires the new 
 
 72. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,633 (discussing the “primary goal” of the larger, 
graphic warnings in response to a comment questioning the new labeling format’s efficacy). 
 73. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69,524, 69,534 (Nov. 12, 2010). 
 74. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,636. 
 75. See id. 
 76. This FDA-sponsored study “quantitatively examined the relative efficacy of the 36 
proposed color graphic images in communicating the harms of smoking.” Id. at 36,637.  The 
D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco described the setup of this study succinctly: 
The study divided respondents into two groups:  a control group that was shown 
the new text in the format of the current warnings (located on the side of cigarette 
packages), and a separate treatment group that was shown the proposed graphic 
warnings, which included the new text, the accompanying graphic image, and the 
1-800-QUIT-NOW number.  Each group then answered questions designed to 
assess, among other things, whether the graphic warnings, relative to the text-only 
control, (1) increased viewers’ intention to quit or refrain from smoking; (2) 
increased viewers’ knowledge of the health risks of smoking or secondhand 
smoke; and (3) were “salient,” which FDA defined in part as causing viewers to 
feel “depressed,” “discouraged,” or “afraid.” 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 77. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,642. 
 78. See generally id. But see infra note 317 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
government abandoned this final rule, and thus the nine images and textual warnings, as a 
result of litigation and tobacco industry opposition). 
 79. See Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images To Deter Smokers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/health/policy/22smoke.html?_r=0 
(displaying the nine images). 
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warnings to list the phone number of a smoking cessation hotline, 1-800-
QUIT-NOW.80 
B.  The First Amendment:  The Freedom To Speak and Not To Speak 
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”81  The freedom of 
expression is a fundamental, foundational right82 and is central to the 
democratic process and individual participation in it.83  As such, the 
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects individuals from 
federal, state, and local governmental interference with this right.84 
Constitutional scholars argue that the First Amendment was a reaction 
against political speech and press restrictions in English society.85  Outside 
this narrow realm, however, it is unclear what the drafters intended the First 
Amendment to protect.86  As such, the Supreme Court has had to opine on 
the speech that the First Amendment protects, the speech that the 
government can regulate, and the proper framework for scrutinizing the 
constitutionality of such acts.87  This section briefly introduces the First 
Amendment, as well as the Court’s approach to evaluating measures that 
 
 80. See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,674.  Individual states and the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services sponsor this “quitline.” See Frequently Asked Questions 
About Quitlines, SMOKEFREE.GOV, http://www.smokefree.gov/quitlines-faq.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2013). 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 82. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (characterizing the freedom 
of thought and speech as “the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form 
of freedom.”); see also 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 14 (4th ed. 2007) (calling First 
Amendment freedom a “touchstone of individual liberty”). 
 83. See, e.g., EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL 
FREE SPEECH:  FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN BUSINESS 36 (1985) (noting 
that free speech is an integral part of democratic society). 
 84. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2, 13–16 (2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the scope of First Amendment protection); Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 58–59 (2000) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply all First Amendment protections to state and local 
governments). 
 85. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 952 (4th 
ed. 2011) (“There is . . . little doubt that the First Amendment was meant to prohibit 
licensing of publication such as existed in England and to forbid punishment for seditious 
libel.”); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 82, at 15–24 (describing the English 
background of the First Amendment). 
 86. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH:  A TREATISE 
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-18 to -19 (1994) (“One can keep going round and round on the 
original meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of what the framers 
meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge.”); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE 
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (noting that the drafters found free speech to be 
important, but that they did not define the specific meaning of the First Amendment). 
 87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, at 953; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1130 (7th ed. 2004) (stating that the Court developed its 
framework for First Amendment analysis in the last quarter of the twentieth century). 
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compel speech, measures that restrict commercial speech, and measures that 
require factual disclosures. 
1.  An Introduction to the First Amendment 
The First Amendment’s language is simple and unqualified.88  Despite 
this simplicity and absoluteness,89 however, the Supreme Court has never 
taken an absolutist approach in interpreting it.90  Rather, it has held that the 
First Amendment allows restraints on free speech for “appropriate 
reasons.”91  The Court’s approach to determining the legitimate instances in 
which speech may be restricted is one based on content neutrality.92  
According to this framework, regulations affecting speech are classified 
either as content based or content neutral.93 
Content-based laws, as the moniker suggests, restrict or compel speech 
based on the speech’s content.94  With some categorical exceptions,95 these 
regulations are “presumptively invalid”96 unless they pass muster under 
strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review.97  To survive strict 
scrutiny, the government must (1) show a compelling interest in 
promulgating the regulation, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote 
that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is 
available.98  Underlying this hardline approach is the core belief that “each 
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving 
of expression, consideration, and adherence” and that “Government action 
 
 88. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
767–72 (17th ed. 2010) (outlining the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 89. Justice Hugo Black argued that the First Amendment should be interpreted literally 
and thus that speech should never be subject to restrictions. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of 
Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 880 (1960) (arguing that the plain language of the 
Constitution shows that the First Amendment did not contain “any qualifications”). 
 90. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting the view that 
First Amendment freedoms are absolute). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (3d ed. 2008). 
 91. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). 
 92. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).  The Court articulated this 
principle of content neutrality in its statement that “above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.” Id. at 95. 
 93. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1131. 
 94. An example of a content-based speech restriction is a ban on sexually explicit 
speech. Eugene Volokh, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment (Including the 
“Secondary Effects” Doctrine), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/2010/06/21/content-discrimination-and-the-first-amendment-including-
the-secondary-effects-doctrine/. In this example, other types of speech are not banned.  
Because this restriction treats speech differently based on the subject matter of the speech, 
the restriction is “content-based.” Id.  
 95. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (noting the categorical exceptions to 
the content-based/content-neutral analytical framework). 
 96. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 97. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). See generally 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, at 960–61. 
 98. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (defining 
the strict scrutiny standard for content-based restrictions). 
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that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance 
of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this 
essential right.”99  So severe is this burden that the government rarely meets 
it.100 
In contrast to content-based laws, content-neutral regulations affect 
speech without regard to the speech’s content.101  The Court allows the 
government to place reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech.102  Accordingly, such measures are examined under 
intermediate scrutiny, which is a more lenient form of judicial review.103  
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that (1) the 
regulation is within its constitutional power, (2) the regulation furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the restriction is no greater 
than necessary to further that interest.104 
This is not to imply, however, that all speech and all laws that regulate 
speech fall neatly into this either-or framework.105  Indeed, the Court has 
deemed certain classes of speech as having “lower value” and thus entitled 
to less or no protection under the First Amendment.106  These categories 
include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech relating to 
criminal conduct.107  Additionally, commercial speech108 and compelled 
speech that corrects potentially misleading information109 are two subsets 
of content-based expression that the Court reviews less stringently.110 
 
 99. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641. 
 100. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1131. 
 101. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). Examples of content-neutral speech 
are bans on loudspeakers or leafleting. Volokh, supra note 94. Because the restriction treats 
speech the same regardless of what the speech says, it is “content-neutral.” Id. 
 102. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1132. 
 103. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642. 
 104. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (establishing a four-part 
standard to test if a content-neutral regulation passes intermediate scrutiny). 
 105. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” (citations omitted)). 
 106. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American 
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 928 (2009) (exploring the Court’s categorical approach 
to the First Amendment and noting that “when people speak about the categorical approach, 
they are referring to the rules that give lesser protection to certain content based on its 
supposed lack of value”). 
 107. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (enumerating categories 
of “lower value” speech); see also Louis J. Virelli III, Permissible Burden or Constitutional 
Violation?  A First Amendment Analysis of Congress’ Proposed Removal of Tax 
Deductibility from Tobacco Advertisements, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 534–35 & n.31 
(2000) (noting that libel, slander, obscenity, and incitement fall outside First Amendment 
protection). 
 108. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing commercial speech and the framework for analyzing 
the First Amendment constitutionality of laws that restrict it). 
 109. See infra Part I.B.4 (discussing mandated factual disclosures and the standard for 
evaluating their constitutionality). 
 110. See infra Part I.B.3.b (explaining that the Supreme Court’s examination of measures 
that restrict commercial speech is a test of intermediate scrutiny); infra Part I.B.4 (examining 
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2.  Compelled Speech 
The First Amendment not only protects the right to speak freely; it also 
protects the right to refrain from speaking.111  This right is so strong, in 
fact, that the Court has found the distinction between compelled speech and 
compelled silence “without constitutional significance.”112  Two cases form 
the core of the Court’s compelled speech doctrine:  West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette113 and Wooley v. Maynard.114  A third 
compelled speech case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of California,115 is germane as it illustrates the Court’s 
application of Barnette and Wooley in the commercial context. 
In 1943, the Court in Barnette examined a regulation adopted by the 
West Virginia State Board of Education that required students to salute the 
American flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.116  A student’s 
noncompliance with this rule would result in expulsion.117  A group of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses sued to enjoin the law, arguing that it infringed on 
their First Amendment rights.118  The Court agreed, finding that the law 
impermissibly invaded the students’ “intellect and spirit,” which the First 
Amendment protects from “official control.”119 
Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Court, articulated this idea and, in 
the process, established the Court’s compelled speech doctrine: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.120 
Forty-four years later in 1977, the Court reaffirmed Barnette’s central 
precept in Wooley.121  In Wooley, a husband and wife challenged a New 
Hampshire law that made it a crime to block out any part of that state’s 
automobile license plate, including the state motto embossed on it.122  The 
couple considered that motto, “Live Free or Die,” repugnant to their moral, 
 
the Court’s approach to required disclosures that correct potential misleading speech, which 
is rational basis review). 
 111. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See generally CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 85, at 1001 (summarizing the Court’s approach to compelled speech); Anna M. 
Taruschio, Note, The First Amendment, the Right Not To Speak and the Problem of 
Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001 (2000). 
 112. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
 113. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 114. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 115. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). 
 116. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627–29. 
 117. See id. at 629. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 642. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 122. See id. at 707. 
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religious, and political beliefs and covered it up, resulting in multiple 
misdemeanor charges.123 
Reviewing the law for First Amendment defects, the Supreme Court 
found the law to be unconstitutional, explaining:  “The right to speak and 
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the 
broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”124  This core value thus 
prohibited New Hampshire from compelling the couple to  “use their 
private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological 
message.”125 
As Barnette and Wooley illustrate, the Court treats identically laws that 
compel content-based speech and laws that restrict content-based speech 
and subjects both to strict scrutiny review.126  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. Public Utilities Commission, the Court made clear that this right not to 
speak extends not only to individuals but also to corporations.127  In that 
case, the Court scrutinized a decision by a California regulator that forced 
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), a private utility company, to print on its 
billing envelopes the views of a private advocacy organization with which 
the company disagreed.128  Equating the envelopes at issue with the 
automobile in Wooley, the Court determined that strict scrutiny applied, 
held that the regulator could not order the utility to use its private property 
to distribute the third party’s message,129 and struck down the regulation.130 
3.  Commercial Speech:  “The Stepchild of the First Amendment”131 
Although the text of the First Amendment does not differentiate between 
commercial and noncommercial speech, the Supreme Court has recognized 
such a distinction.132  The Court has yet to establish the exact contours of 
 
 123. See id. at 707–08. 
 124. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Id. at 715. 
 126. See id. at 715–16. 
 127. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (“For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the 
choice of what not to say.”). 
 128. See id. at 4–7.  This organization, called Toward Utility Rate Normalization 
(TURN), was a consumer activist organization that regularly opposed PG&E in ratemaking 
proceedings. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 
1739 (1991).  The state regulator ordered that the “space remaining in the [PG&E] billing 
envelope, after inclusion of the monthly bill” had to be divided between the utility and 
TURN. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6. 
 129. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 17–18 (“[In Wooley,] [t]he ‘private property’ 
that was used to spread the unwelcome message was the automobile, not the license plates.  
Similarly, the Commission’s order requires appellant to use its property—the billing 
envelopes—to distribute the message of another.”). 
 130. See id. at 20–21. 
 131. Comment, Developments in the Law:  Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1005, 1027–29 (1967) (discussing the constitutional status of commercial speech). 
 132. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-history and Pre-history of Commercial 
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 757–58 (1993). 
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what constitutes commercial speech;133 however, it has said that, at the very 
least, it is speech that “propose[s] a commercial transaction,” such as 
advertising.134 
a.  From “No Protection” to “Limited Protection”:  The Beginning 
of the Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not 
protect commercial speech.135  This changed in 1975, when the Court 
offered commercial speech limited constitutional protection.136  A year 
later, the Court clarified its position in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,137 striking down a state law that 
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.138  
In doing so, the Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects both 
the right to disseminate and receive information139 and that a speaker’s 
economic interests do not affect those rights.140 
 
 133. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (noting 
that “the precise bounds” of commercial speech “are subject to doubt”). 
 134. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976); see also Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989) 
(noting that the test for whether speech is commercial is whether it proposes a commercial 
transaction).  The Court also has said that commercial speech (1) is an advertisement of 
some kind, (2) refers to a specific product, and (3) represents the speaker’s economic 
motivation. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (finding 
unsolicited mailings of contraceptive information to be commercial speech and holding that 
a federal statute prohibiting distribution of such information violated the First Amendment). 
 135. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding a city ordnance that 
outlawed the circulation of handbills and explaining that “the Constitution imposes no . . . 
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”); see also Martin H. 
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:  Commercial Speech and the Values of 
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971) (“[The Court in Chrestensen,] 
without citing precedent, historical evidence, or policy considerations, . . . effectively read 
commercial speech out of the First Amendment.”). See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra 
note 132, at 754–59 (giving an overview of the development of the commercial speech 
doctrine). 
 136. Interestingly, commercial speech protection first arose in the public health context. 
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (holding that advertisements for abortion 
services in newspapers are protected by the First Amendment and that “speech is not 
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears” as a commercial 
advertisement); see also M. Neil Browne et al., Advertising to Children and the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine:  Political and Constitutional Limitations, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 91–92 
(2009) (noting that Bigelow clarified commercial speech protection for certain activities).  
Later cases would solidify this connection. See infra notes 137–44, 169 and accompanying 
text (detailing the Court’s decisions in cases regarding speech restrictions in the public 
health context, including acts regulating the advertising of the price of prescription drugs, 
alcohol, and cigarettes). 
 137. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629–31 (1990) (discussing the evolution of 
commercial speech starting in 1976). 
 138. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50. 
 139. See id. at 756–57. 
 140. See id. at 762. 
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The Court also recognized that the consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information, particularly information regarding drug prices, 
may surpass her interest in political discourse,141 a realm of speech long 
deemed by the Court as deserving of First Amendment protection.142  For 
these reasons, the Court held that the First Amendment protects speech that 
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction,”143 as long as that 
speech is not false, deceptive or misleading.144 
b.  The Court Establishes a Standard with Central Hudson 
Four years after the Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment 
protected commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court articulated a 
test to evaluate the constitutionality of government regulation of 
commercial speech in Central Hudson.145  This four-part test, which the 
Court later identified as one of intermediate scrutiny,146 asks:  (1) Is the 
speech at issue not deceptive or false and does it concern lawful activity?147  
(2) Is the government’s restriction justified by a substantial government 
interest?148  (3) Does the regulation directly advance the government’s 
asserted interest?149  (4) Is the restriction no more extensive than 
necessary?150  Answering “yes” to each of these queries yields a regulation 
that constitutionally restricts commercial speech; any “no” answer indicates 
a regulation that is unconstitutional.151 
At issue in Central Hudson was a New York law that prohibited 
promotional advertising by utility companies.152  An energy shortage had 
prompted the New York Public Service Commission to order this ban.153  
 
 141. In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun opined eloquently on the value of 
commercial speech:  “As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s 
most urgent political debate.” Id. at 763–64; see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status 
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2000) (contending that commercial speech 
is constitutionally protected because of the informational function that advertising serves). 
But see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449, 486 (1985) (contending that commercial speech should not be constitutionally 
protected because it is unaffiliated with the political process); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco 
Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606–07 (1996) (arguing that 
commercial speech should not be afforded the same protection as noncommercial speech). 
 142. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the high value placed on the 
free flow of political discourse in First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 143. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citation omitted). 
 144. See id. at 771–72. 
 145. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 146. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“[The Court] engage[s] 
in ‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing them under the 
framework set forth in [Central Hudson].”). 
 147. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 558. 
 153. See id. at 558–59. 
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The thinking behind it was that advertising promoted the use of electricity, 
which increased consumer demand despite insufficient sources of supply.154  
Three years after the ban, the energy crisis had passed, but the advertising 
restriction remained in force.155  Central Hudson Gas and Electric 
Corporation filed suit, alleging that the ban violated its First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.156 
In this context, the Court developed and applied its four-prong test.157  
The Court found that the first two prongs of the test were satisfied158:  the 
utility’s promotional advertising was not misleading or unlawful,159 and the 
State’s asserted interests in conserving energy and maintaining fair and 
efficient electricity rates were substantial.160  Under the third prong, the 
Court accepted the State’s argument that advertising and electricity demand 
were directly connected and that an advertising ban would lessen demand 
for it, thus establishing a link between the State’s interest in conservation 
and the Commission’s advertising ban.161 
However, the regulation failed the fourth prong of the test.162  Under it, 
the Court concluded that the State had failed to establish that the regulation 
was not more extensive than necessary to further its substantial interest in 
energy conservation.163  Troubling to the Court was that the ban implicated 
all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on energy consumption; 
the State had not shown that a less restrictive regulation would not 
accomplish its goal of energy conservation.164  For this reason, the Court 
declared the law unconstitutional.165 
With Central Hudson, the Court established a test for examining 
measures that regulate commercial speech.166  In doing so, however, the 
Court did not specify the scope of this test.167  It was therefore unclear if the 
standard should apply solely to the type of restriction addressed in Central 
Hudson—a law that restricts speech—or if the standard should apply more 
generally to any law that affects commercial speech, regardless of whether 
that law restricts speech or compels it.168  Of note, however, is that since its 
 
 154. See id. at 559. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 560–61. 
 157. See id. at 566–72; see also supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–69. 
 159. See id. at 566–68. 
 160. See id. at 568–69. 
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 162. See id. at 569–72. 
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 165. Id. at 570–72. 
 166. Id. at 566. 
 167. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 
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 2832 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
decision in Central Hudson, the Court has only used this standard to test 
measures that restrict speech.169 
4.  Factual Disclosures that Prevent Consumer Deception 
Five years after Central Hudson, the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of a required disclosure provision in Zauderer.170  The 
Court held that compelled disclosures of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” that aim to protect consumers from 
“confusion or deception” and that are not “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome” are to be reviewed under the rational basis standard.171 
In so holding, the Court carved out an exception to its compelled and 
commercial speech doctrines:  if a compelled disclosure met certain criteria, 
then rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, applied.  
Since that decision, courts have applied and developed this exception. 
a.  The Supreme Court Creates the Zauderer Exception to Strict Scrutiny for 
the Correction of Potentially Misleading Speech 
Zauderer involved an Ohio attorney who published an advertisement 
offering to represent women who were injured by a faulty medical 
device.172  The advertisement featured an illustration of the medical device 
and asserted that losing clients would not owe legal fees;173 it did not 
disclose that clients would owe court costs and expenses.174 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
disciplined the lawyer for publishing this advertisement on the grounds that 
he violated three Disciplinary Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional 
Practice:  a rule prohibiting advertisements containing information or 
advice about a specific legal problem; a rule banning the use of illustrations 
in attorney advertising; and a rule forbidding attorney deception.175  The 
 
 169. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (using Central 
Hudson to examine and strike down restrictions on outdoor advertising and point-of-sale 
advertising of tobacco products); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) 
(declaring unconstitutional under Central Hudson a law banning the advertising of alcohol 
prices); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding 
under Central Hudson a law restricting gambling casinos from advertising to residents); 
Michelle Silva Fernandes, Note, Party Foul:  The Fourth Circuit’s Improper Application of 
the Commercial Speech Test in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (2011) (exploring restrictions on alcohol advertisements in 
college student publications and arguing that Central Hudson is the proper standard for 
analyzing them). 
 170. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 171. See id. at 651 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See id. at 629–31.  The defective device was a Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. 
See id. at 630. 
 173. See id. at 630–31. 
 174. See id. at 633. 
 175. See id. at 634–35. 
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lawyer appealed the decision, contending that the Ohio Code violated the 
First Amendment.176 
The Supreme Court examined the three code provisions for First 
Amendment defects, striking down the first two but upholding the third.177  
Regarding the first, the Court held that a state could not prohibit advertising 
geared to persons with a specific legal problem.178 
As for the second, the Court recognized that visual components of 
advertisements served important communicative functions:  graphics attract 
the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message and have the ability 
to impart information directly.179  For this reason, images were entitled to 
the same First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial 
speech.180  Consequently, the Court held that advertisements could contain 
illustrations as long as those graphic were not deceptive, misleading, or 
confusing.181 
The Court found, however, that the third disciplinary charge brought 
against the lawyer—that is, his failure to disclose in the advertisement that 
his clients might be liable for litigation costs even if their lawsuits were 
unsuccessful—was constitutional.182  Notably, the Court declined to use 
either strict scrutiny or the Central Hudson test to assess the rule’s 
constitutionality.183  Rather, the Court reviewed the rule using rational basis 
assessment.184 
The Court gave two reasons for taking this approach.185  First, the Court 
distinguished the speech requirement in Wooley and Barnette from the 
disclosure requirement at issue in Zauderer.186  In Wooley and Barnette, 
laws forced speakers to voice political, nationalistic, religious orthodoxy, or 
other “matters of opinion,”187 while in Zauderer, the requirement 
compelled the disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information” about legal services.188  For the Court, this was significant, as 
the Zauderer disclosure was of importance to consumers.189  The Court 
further explained that its justification for protecting commercial speech 
under the First Amendment was chiefly concerned with the information’s 
 
 176. See id. at 636. 
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value to consumers.  In this case, an attorney’s constitutionally protected 
interest in not providing the required factual information was “minimal.”190 
Second, the Court found that unlike the regulation at issue in Central 
Hudson, the disclosure requirement did not restrict speech—it compelled 
it191—and thus encroached more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than 
an across-the-board prohibition.192  For these the two reasons, the Court 
decided to employ rational basis review, finding that the disclosure 
requirement was reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
consumer deception of consumers, and upheld the rule.193 
Thus, with Zauderer, the Court established a rational basis standard that 
is applicable to certain laws that require disclosures.  If (1) a compelled 
disclosure consists of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” 
(2) aims to protect consumers from “confusion or deception,” and (3) is not 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome,” then that disclosure requirement is 
scrutinized to determine if it reasonably relates to the state’s interest, rather 
than the more stringent strict scrutiny standard that is applied in other First 
Amendment contexts.194 
b.  Zauderer Applied:  Three Instructive Cases 
After the Supreme Court defined this narrow exception to its compelled 
and commercial speech doctrines, the Court and numerous circuit courts 
have ruled on the constitutionality of disclosure requirements.  In doing so, 
the courts have delineated the reach and import of the Zauderer exception.  
Three cases in particular—Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy;195 Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States;196 and Entertainment Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich197—are used as authority by the parties in litigation over the 
graphic warning labels and thus are relevant for understanding the circuit 
split. 
The Supreme Court decided Ibanez in 1994, nine years after Zauderer.  
Similar to the facts of Zauderer, Ibanez involved an attorney who was 
reprimanded for violating rules of professional conduct.198  In addition to 
her membership in the Florida bar, Ibanez was a Certified Public 
Accountant and a Certified Financial Planner (CFP),199 and she included 
this CFP designation in her yellow pages listing, on her business cards, and 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 650 (noting the “material differences between disclosure requirements and 
outright prohibitions on speech”). 
 192. Id. at 651. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
 196. 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 197. 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 198. See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 139–42. 
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on her law office letterhead.200  The Florida Board of Accountancy, a state 
regulator, argued that the use of this “specialist” designation was 
“potentially misleading” to consumers.201  The board sought to require 
Ibanez to include a disclaimer on her promotional materials that explained 
that the accrediting agency was not affiliated with the government and that 
set out the agency’s accreditation requirements.202 
On review, the Supreme Court found the board’s action unjustified 
because it had failed “to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely 
hypothetical.”203  As such, the Court declined to apply the Zauderer 
standard because the board could not show that the commercial speech at 
issue would mislead consumers.204  The Court also noted that the proposed 
disclaimer was “unduly burdensome.”205 
Milavetz is another case cited in litigation over the graphic warning 
labels.  In Milavetz, the Court analyzed and upheld two disclosure 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (BAPCPA) using Zauderer.206  One of the challenged provisions 
required debt relief agencies to “clearly and conspicuously disclose in any 
advertisement of bankruptcy assistance services . . . that the services or 
benefits are with respect to bankruptcy relief.”207  Another provision 
required qualifying professionals to state:  “We are a debt relief agency.  
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”208  
The Milavetz law firm challenged the enforcement of BAPCPA’s 
disclosure requirements,209 arguing an intermediate scrutiny standard 
governed and that the State’s attempt to compel speech should be struck 
down.210   
The Court declined to apply Central Hudson for two reasons.211  First, 
the Court found that the BAPCPA provision “share[d] the essential features 
of the rule at issue in Zauderer.”212  Because the BAPCPA provision, like 
the rule of professional conduct at issue in Zauderer, was directed at 
correcting misleading speech, Zauderer governed.213  Second, the Court 
distinguished the challenged BAPCPA disclosure requirement, which 
 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 146. 
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 2836 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
compelled speech, from the rule scrutinized in Central Hudson, which 
restricted speech.214  The Court then examined the BAPCPA provision and 
upheld it because, like in Zauderer, the law firm’s advertisements were 
“inherently misleading” because the advertisements promised “debt relief 
without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has 
inherent costs.”215 
Finally, Blagojevich, a decision from the Seventh Circuit, is also 
informative.  At issue in Blagojevich was an Illinois law that required video 
game retailers to place a four-square-inch “18” sticker on video games that 
fell within the State’s definition of “sexually explicit.”216  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the sticker “force[d] the game-seller to include . . . a 
subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s content is 
sexually explicit.”217  Because of the subjectivity and controversial nature 
of this required disclosure, the Seventh Circuit held that Zauderer did not 
apply and instead used strict scrutiny.218  In doing so, it found that the 
sticker “literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored” because the sticker 
covered a substantial portion of the box and the State “failed to . . . explain 
why a smaller sticker would not suffice.”219  For this reason, the Seventh 
Circuit invalidated the law.220 
II.  CONFUSION IN THE COURTS:  THE GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS’ 
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING IT 
Part II outlines the conflict between the Sixth and D.C. Circuits over the 
constitutionality of the TCA’s labeling requirement.  It pays particular 
attention to the different frameworks that the circuits and district courts 
employed to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and those courts’ 
application of those standards to evaluate the graphic warning labels. 
Part II.A details the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Discount Tobacco City & 
Lottery, Inc. v. United States,221 which affirmed a lower court judgment 
finding the required use of graphics constitutional.  The Sixth Circuit relied 
on Zauderer in using rational basis review, rejecting the trial court’s use of 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, to affirm the trial court’s 
conclusion that the graphics-based speech could be mandated.  Part II.B 
discusses the D.C. Circuit’s decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
FDA,222 which affirmed a lower court ruling that the images violated the 
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First Amendment.  The D.C. Circuit, however, rejecting the strict scrutiny 
standard that had been employed by the district court, examined the images 
using the Central Hudson factors. 
A.  The Sixth Circuit:  Discount Tobacco City & 
Lottery, Inc. v. United States 
In Discount Tobacco City, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial 
challenge223 to the TCA’s labeling requirement.224  The court determined 
that the provision was subject to the strict scrutiny required by the First 
Amendment unless the speech was designed to correct misleading 
information, in which case Zauderer controlled.225  Applying this 
framework, the court determined that the Zauderer rational basis test 
governed226 and held that the regulation passed this review and was 
constitutional.227  In doing so, the panel majority upheld the district court’s 
judgment.228  One judge, after examining the rule under Zauderer, 
dissented, argued that the provision was not rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest.229 
1.  The District Court:  The Graphic Warning Label Requirement Is 
Constitutional Using Central Hudson Intermediate Scrutiny 
In late August 2009, approximately two months after President Obama 
signed the TCA into law,230 six tobacco manufacturers and retailers231 filed 
suit in the Western District of Kentucky.232  The tobacco companies 
challenged several of the TCA’s provisions, including the graphic warning 
label requirement,233 which they argued violated their rights to free speech 
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infra Part II.B. 
 225. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 226. See infra notes 253–63 and accompanying text. 
 227. See infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 228. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 229. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 230. The TCA became law in June 2009. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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 232. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 233. The tobacco companies challenged four other provisions of the TCA:  (1) restrictions 
on the marketing of “modified-risk tobacco products”; (2) a ban on claims that convey the 
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under the First Amendment.234  Because of this timing, the suit constituted 
a facial challenge to the labeling provision.235  As such, the district court 
assessed the First Amendment constitutionality of the provision itself; it did 
not examine the particular images that the FDA eventually chose for the 
labels.236 
The tobacco companies put forth three arguments in support of their 
claim.237  First, relying on Ibanez and citing data demonstrating that the 
public was aware of smoking’s risks and overestimated them,238 the 
companies argued that because there was no real harm for the warnings to 
remedy, the warning provision was unnecessary.239  Second, the companies 
claimed that the warnings required by the TCA were unlawful because they 
were larger and more prominent than the disclosures invalidated in 
Blagojevich240 and Ibanez.241  Finally, the companies contended that, 
because the disclosure requirement did not fall within the Zauderer 
exception, the graphics requirement should be assessed using strict scrutiny 
and struck down.242 
The district court dismissed each of these arguments.243  First, citing 
studies that illustrated both the ineffectiveness of the purely textual 
warnings and the improved efficacy expected to come from the TCA labels, 
the court found the labeling requirement to be justified.244  Second, the 
court found that the government had provided reasons for the particular size 
and format of the TCA warnings, distinguishing them from the warnings 
struck down in Blagojevich, in which the State failed to explain why a 
smaller warning would be inappropriate.245  Finally, the court rejected the 
companies’ argument to review the restriction under strict scrutiny.246  The 
court reasoned that because the textual element of the TCA warnings was 
objective and uncontroversial, the additional graphic element was too.247 
 
impression that tobacco products are approved by, or safer by virtue of being regulated by, 
the FDA; (3) prohibitions on color and imagery in tobacco product advertising; (4) bans of 
event sponsorship, branding nontobacco merchandise, and free sampling. See id. at 519–20. 
 234. See id. at 521. 
 235. Since the suit in the district court was filed two months after the passage of the TCA, 
the FDA had not yet selected the images for the labels. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, 
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552–54 (6th Cir. 2012).  A facial challenge was thus the 
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 236. Id. at 552–53. 
 237. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 528–31. 
 238. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text (striking down an attorney 
disclosure requirement as not rationally related to state’s interest under Zauderer). 
 239. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
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 241. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529–30. 
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 244. See id. at 530–31. 
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 247. See id. 
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After rejecting these arguments, the court subjected the provision to 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.248  In doing so, the court 
found that the warnings were sufficiently tailored to advance the 
government’s substantial interest.249  As a result, on January 5, 2010, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the government on the labeling 
requirement claim.250 
2.  The Sixth Circuit Affirms, but Does So Using 
Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer 
On March 19, 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.251  The court examined the law using a two-step framework:  if 
the disclosure fit within Zauderer, rational basis review applied; if it did 
not, strict scrutiny applied under the Supreme Court’s compelled speech 
doctrine.252  The Sixth Circuit did not consider applying the Central 
Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard. 
Debunking arguments that images could never be factual or accurate, the 
court determined that the provision ought to be assessed under Zauderer.253  
The court cited three reasons for this.  First, the court referenced images 
found in textbooks, from which students learn factual information about the 
body and disease.254  Despite the possibility that people could have medical 
conditions that deviate from the depictions found in a textbook, those 
images remain factual; they do not become nonfactual or opinions.255 
Second, the court of appeals relied on Zauderer itself, reasoning that, 
because the Supreme Court had deemed the illustration of the medical 
device in that case to be constitutionally permissible,256 pictures that 
accurately represent the negative health consequences of smoking were 
acceptable, too.257 
Finally, the court distinguished the TCA’s labeling requirement from the 
disclosure struck down in Blagojevich.  The TCA’s required warning was 
 
 248. Id. at 532. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. at 519. 
 251. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 
2012).  Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial challenge to the TCA’s 
labeling provision. See id. at 552–54.  By the time this case reached the circuit court, the 
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rule regarding the new warnings. See id. at 552–53.  Citing judicial restraint, the language of 
the district court’s decision, the tobacco companies’ admission that the challenge was a 
facial one, and Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit declined to review the labeling 
provision as-applied—that is, to review the specific images themselves for constitutional 
defects. See id. at 553. 
 252. See id. at 554. 
 253. See id. at 558–61. 
 254. See id. at 559. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (holding that images are entitled to 
the same First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial speech). 
 257. See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560. 
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designed to provide factual information, while the Blagojevich disclosure 
communicated the opinion of the government.258  For these reasons, the 
court concluded that the TCA’s labeling provision should be assessed using 
Zauderer rational basis review and was not subject to strict scrutiny.259 
After determining that Zauderer governed, the court examined the 
labeling requirement to determine whether the government had established 
a rational relationship between the provision and the goal of preventing 
consumer deception.260  The court determined that the government had 
successfully carried its burden, citing the tobacco industry’s “decades-long 
deception” of the public about the health risks and the addictiveness of 
smoking;261 evidence that the existing warning requirements ineffectively 
conveyed the risks of tobacco use, particularly to youths and adults with 
low levels of education;262 and evidence that larger warnings that 
incorporate images led to a greater understanding of smoking’s health 
consequences.263  For these reasons, the court of appeals found that the 
requirement passed muster under rational basis and was constitutionally 
permissible.264  The tobacco companies petitioned for a rehearing en banc, 
which was denied on May 31, 2012,265 and filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari on October 26, 2012.266 
3.  The Dissent:  The Requirement Fails 
Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer 
The dissenting judge in Discount Tobacco City, Judge Eric L. Clay, 
agreed with the panel majority that the provision should be scrutinized 
under Zauderer.267  However, after doing so, Judge Clay concluded that the 
government had not shown that the warning labels were a reasonably 
tailored response to addressing tobacco consumers’ ignorance of smoking’s 
harms.268  Specifically, Judge Clay was troubled that the graphic warning 
 
 258. See id. at 560–61. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 562. 
 261. See id. (“Tobacco manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations . . . 
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 263. See id. at 565 (“[A]bundant evidence establishes that larger warnings incorporating 
graphics promote a greater understanding of tobacco-related health risks and materially 
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 264. See id. at 569. 
 265. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Am. Snuff Co., LLC v. United States, No. 
12-521 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012). 
 266. See id.  As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will 
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 267. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527–28 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 268. See id. at 527–29. 
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labels appeared calculated to provoke emotion and frighten consumers, 
rather than educating them or correcting misinformation.269 
Judge Clay identified a difference between providing truthful and 
sometimes frightening information to the public and “flagrantly 
manipulat[ing]” the emotions of consumers, and found it dispositive.270  For 
Judge Clay, the latter was “less clearly permissible” than the former.271  
This was because the images provoked differing emotions among those 
who view them:  some viewers inevitably interpret them in one fashion, 
while other viewers saw them another way.272  Because of this 
incongruence, Judge Clay concluded that the labels “cannot accurately 
convey all of the health risks associated with tobacco use” and were thus 
not reasonably tailored.273 
B.  The D.C. Circuit:  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA 
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, the D.C. Circuit considered an as-applied 
challenge274 to the TCA’s labeling requirement and examined the nine 
images themselves for violations of the First Amendment.  After concluding 
that the labels were not subject to review under Zauderer (i.e., they 
constituted mandated speech that was noncorrective), the court examined 
the labels using Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard and found 
that the warnings offended the First Amendment.275  In doing so, the court 
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the D.C. District Court, which held that 
the images were unconstitutional because they failed strict scrutiny.276  One 
judge dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the labels, with the 
exception of the 1-800-QUIT-NOW hotline number, were both 
constitutional under Zauderer and Central Hudson.277 
1.  The District Court Holds That the Images Do Not Survive Strict 
Scrutiny and Are Unconstitutional 
On August 16, 2011, two months after the FDA issued its final rule about 
the warnings and images, five tobacco manufacturers278 filed suit in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the TCA’s labeling 
 
 269. See id. at 528.  Unlike the panel majority, Judge Clay addressed the graphic warning 
label requirement both facially and as applied. See id. 
 270. Id. at 529. 
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 275. See infra notes 294–315 and accompanying text. 
 276. See infra notes 283–86 and accompanying text. 
 277. See infra notes 318–27 and accompanying text. 
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Commonwealth Brands, Liggett, and Santa Fe. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 
F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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provision, and the FDA’s implementation of it, violated their First 
Amendment rights.279  Judge Richard J. Leon concluded that, because the 
provision forced speech, it was subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme 
Court’s compelled speech doctrine unless an exception—specifically, 
rational basis review under Zauderer—applied.280  Judge Leon found that 
an exception was not warranted because the images were not designed to 
correct the same kind of misleading speech at issue in Zauderer and its 
progeny.281  Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny.282 
Judge Leon determined that the TCA labels failed all three parts of the 
strict scrutiny analysis.283  Regarding the first element, Judge Leon found 
that although the government’s interest in warning consumers about the 
dangers of smoking was compelling, its interest in advocating that the 
public not purchase cigarettes, a legal product, was not.284  As for the 
second, Judge Leon concluded that the “‘sheer size and display 
requirements for the graphic images are anything but narrowly tailored.’”285  
Finally, Judge Leon accepted the five alternatives for reducing smoking 
rates that the tobacco companies offered as viable, less burdensome, and 
less restrictive than the warning labels.286 
For these reasons, Judge Leon determined that the FDA failed to meet its 
burden in proving that the graphic warning labels were narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.287  As a result, on February 29, 
2012, Judge Leon found the graphic labels unconstitutional and enjoined 
their rollout.288 
2.  The D.C. Circuit Affirms but Uses Intermediate Scrutiny 
Under Central Hudson 
On August 25, 2012, a divided panel affirmed Judge Leon’s judgment.289  
The circuit court first determined the applicable level of scrutiny under 
which it would examine the labeling requirement.290  Like the district court, 
the D.C. Circuit recognized that content-based speech regulations—
 
 279. See id. at 268. 
 280. See id. at 272. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See id. at 274–77. 
 284. See id. at 274–75. 
 285. Id. at 275 (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 48 
(D.D.C. 2011)). 
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 287. See id. at 275–77. 
 288. See id. at 277. 
 289. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 290. See id. at 1211–17. 
 2013] JOE CAMEL VERSUS UNCLE SAM 2843 
including compelled speech—were subject to strict scrutiny with some 
exceptions.291  Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit enumerated two 
exceptions in the commercial speech context:  Zauderer and Central 
Hudson.292  The court then examined the images to see if they fell into one 
of these exempt categories.293 
The court concluded that Zauderer was inapplicable.294  It reasoned that 
because the TCA banned the practices and descriptors that would make 
cigarette advertising and labeling misleading,295 and because of the absence 
of congressional findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging 
itself, scrutinizing the labels under Zauderer was unjustified.296  The court 
then dismissed the argument that the failure to display the negative health 
consequences of smoking in label disclosures was misleading297 and also 
rejected the argument that the warning labels should be evaluated in the 
context of the historical deception that preceded them.298 
Finally, the court held that the graphic warnings did not constitute the 
type of “‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information”299 or “accurate 
statement[s],” to which the Zauderer standard applied.300  Rather, the court 
characterized the images as “inflammatory”301 and as “unabashed attempts 
to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers 
into quitting.”302  It also determined that the images were subject to 
misinterpretation by consumers.303 
Because the case did not fall under Zauderer, the court then determined 
whether strict or intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.304  Citing circuit 
precedent305 and recognizing that other circuits held contrary views—
specifically, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco City and the Seventh 
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Circuit in Blagojevich—the court held that Central Hudson was the 
appropriate standard.306 
The court then scrutinized the labels using Central Hudson.307  Applying 
Central Hudson’s first prong, the court examined the administrative record 
and found that the government’s primary goal in adopting the graphic 
warning rule was to “discourage nonsmokers from initiating cigarette use 
and to encourage current smokers to consider quitting.”308  The court 
assumed that this interest was substantial and moved on.309 
As for the second prong, the court evaluated whether the FDA had shown 
“substantial evidence” that the graphic warnings would “directly” reduce 
smoking rates.310  The court concluded that there was “no evidence 
showing that [similar] warnings have directly caused a material decrease in 
smoking rates in any of the countries that now require them.”311  The court 
also took issue with the Canadian and Australian studies that the FDA had 
relied on in promulgating the final rule, noting that while these studies 
“indicated that large graphic warnings might induce individual smokers to 
reduce consumption, or to help persons who have already quit smoking 
remain abstinent,” the studies “did not purport to show that the 
implementation of large graphic warnings has actually led to a reduction in 
smoking rates.”312 
For these reasons, the court concluded that the FDA had not provided “a 
shred of evidence—much less the ‘substantial evidence’ . . . —showing that 
the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the 
number of Americans who smoke.”313  The court thus held that because the 
graphic warnings did not satisfy Central Hudson’s second prong that the 
restriction be sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest,314 they 
were an unconstitutional restriction on the tobacco companies’ First 
Amendment rights.315  The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, 
which was denied on December 5, 2012,316 and did not appeal the decision 
to the Supreme Court.317 
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3.  The Dissent:  The Images Fall Within Zauderer’s Ambit, Survive Both 
Rational Basis and Central Hudson Review, and Are Constitutional 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Judith W. Rogers found that the labels 
were constitutional under both Zauderer and Central Hudson, except with 
regard to inclusion of the smoking cessation phone number, which she 
found unconstitutional.318 
To Judge Rogers, because the labels were “indisputably commercial 
speech,” the question was whether Zauderer or Central Hudson applied.319  
Judge Rogers argued that the labels presented factually accurate 
information and addressed misleading commercial speech, so Zauderer 
applied.320  Accordingly, she then subjected the labeling requirement to 
rational basis review under Zauderer and found that it survived this basic 
level of scrutiny.321 
Additionally, Judge Rogers found the warnings constitutional under 
Central Hudson.322  In reaching this conclusion, she took issue with the 
majority’s articulation and examination of the government’s stated interests 
in promulgating the labeling rule.323  Judge Rogers argued that the FDA 
had articulated two complementary but distinct interests—decreasing 
smoking rates and effectively communicating the negative health 
consequences of smoking324—and that the majority erred in dismissing the 
latter interest as “too vague.”325  By doing so, Judge Rogers argued, the 
majority sidestepped much of the substantial evidence supporting the 
warning label requirement326 and thus disregarded the “voluminous 
findings” that illuminated a legitimate government interest to which the 
labeling requirement was reasonably related.327  For this reason, Judge 
Rogers determined that the government also met its burden under the 
heightened scrutiny test of Central Hudson.328 
 
Human Services] and FDA, not to seek Supreme Court review of the First Amendment 
issues at the present time . . . .’”).  The government cited the appeal deadline and the fierce 
opposition to the labels from the tobacco industry in making this decision. Id. By abandoning 
this legal battle, the government abandoned the final rule that it promulgated and thus the 
nine images and textual warnings that it chose. Id.  Writing in response to this decision, Dr. 
Howard K. Koh, Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, vowed that “[t]he FDA . . . will undertake research to support new rulemaking on 
graphic warning labels consistent with the [TCA].” Howard K. Koh, A Steadfast 
Commitment To End the Tobacco Epidemic, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2013, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-howard-k-koh/a-steadfast-commitment-to_b_2901521
.html. 
 318. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1222–23 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 319. Id. at 1222. 
 320. See id. at 1233. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. at 1234–36. 
 323. See id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 1223. 
 326. See id. at 1234–36. 
 327. Id. at 1223. 
 328. Id. at 1233–36. 
 2846 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Finally, Judge Rogers found that requiring the tobacco companies to 
include the 1-800-QUIT-NOW smoking cessation number on the graphic 
labels was unconstitutional, reasoning that the government had not 
explained why a less burdensome alternative was inadequate.329  She 
concluded that the requirement was more extensive than necessary, thus 
violating Central Hudson’s fourth prong.330   
III.  THE TCA’S GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS 
SHOULD BE FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
As discussed in Part II, the Sixth and D.C. Circuits disagree over the 
constitutionality of the TCA’s graphic warning labels, the appropriate level 
of scrutiny for analyzing these labels, and the appropriate framework for 
selecting that scrutiny.  This part argues that the Sixth Circuit and the 
District Court for the District of Columbia pinpointed the correct 
framework for analyzing the graphic warning labels but that only the D.C. 
District Court applied it correctly.  The D.C. District Court determined that 
the graphic labels did not fall within the Zauderer exception and thus 
analyzed them under strict scrutiny.  The court then found that the labels 
did not satisfy strict scrutiny and determined that they were 
unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, this part first asserts that the graphic warnings at issue in 
this split should be examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer 
exception applies.  Central Hudson is inapposite because it has been 
applied chiefly when commercial speech is restricted.  This part then argues 
that the graphic labels do not qualify for the Zauderer exception and 
therefore must be strictly scrutinized.  Finally, it concludes that the TCA 
warning labels do not survive this level of review and are thus 
unconstitutional. 
A.  A Framework for Analysis:  The Labels Should Be Subjected to Strict 
Scrutiny Unless the Zauderer Exception Applies 
The legal controversy over the TCA’s graphic warning labels exposes the 
current messy state of First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of 
commercial speech.331  This section argues that the Sixth Circuit and the 
D.C. District Court identified the correct paradigm for assessing the labels’ 
constitutionality:  Zauderer’s rational basis standard applies if the graphic 
warnings are corrective, uncontroversial, and justified.332  Central 
Hudson’s test of intermediate scrutiny examines laws that restrict speech, 
not laws that compel it,333 and thus is inappropriate for this analysis.  As 
 
 329. See id. at 1236–37. 
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 331. See supra Part II. 
 332. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 333. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. 
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such, should Zauderer not govern, the labels should be examined according 
to strict scrutiny. 
1.  Zauderer Applies If the Warnings Are Corrective 
Amid the confusion over the proper analytical framework for assessing 
the graphic warnings, the place of the Zauderer exception is 
unambiguous.334  Indeed, each of the decisions that form this circuit split—
the Sixth and D.C. Circuit majorities, the dissenting opinions, and the 
district court judgments alike—include the Zauderer exception as a part of 
their analytical frameworks.335  This is most certainly because the Supreme 
Court is clear about Zauderer’s applicability:  if a compelled commercial 
disclosure (1) consists of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” 
(2) aims to protect consumers from “confusion or deception,” and (3) is not 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome,”336 the disclosure falls within 
Zauderer’s ambit.337  Subsequent disclosure cases like Ibanez,338 
Milavetz,339 and Blagojevich340 confirm this.  Thus, because the 
requirement at issue in this split compels a disclosure of commercial 
speech, the Zauderer exception is a necessary component in the 
conversation regarding the First Amendment constitutionality of the labels.  
For this reason, if the labels fall within the confines of the Zauderer 
exception, they should be analyzed under it. 
2.  If Zauderer Does Not Apply, the Warning Labels Should Be Subjected 
to Strict Scrutiny, Not Intermediate Scrutiny Under Central Hudson 
Unlike the uncontested role of Zauderer within the analytical framework, 
the second step in this constitutional analysis—the level of scrutiny that 
should govern if Zauderer does not—is a source of considerable contention 
among the four courts that have examined the TCA labels.  As discussed in 
Part II, the district court in Discount Tobacco City341 and the D.C. Circuit in 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco determined that Central Hudson applied if Zauderer 
did not.342  The Sixth Circuit343 and the D.C. District Court, in contrast, 
held that strict scrutiny applied.344  Thus, a critical element in resolving the 
circuit split is to determine the default level of scrutiny should Zauderer not 
apply:  intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson or strict scrutiny as in 
Wooley and Barnette? 
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The confusion over Central Hudson’s relevance to assessing the labels 
can be attributed in part to the fact that the Court did not specify the scope 
of the Central Hudson standard in Central Hudson itself.345  As such, 
Central Hudson’s role in the analysis is unclear from that decision alone.346  
Later decisions employing Central Hudson do not expressly define the 
standard’s contours.347  The Supreme Court should clarify this ambiguity to 
avoid further disagreement and confusion. 
This being said, the Court has implied that Central Hudson is 
inapplicable when examining laws that compel commercial speech like the 
TCA’s warning label requirement.  First, in subsequent application of the 
Central Hudson standard, the Court has only used it to determine the 
constitutionality of laws that restrict speech, not compel it.348  This suggests 
that the Court does not intend for Central Hudson to be the default standard 
for assessing any and all laws that touch upon commercial speech.  Instead, 
it appears that Central Hudson should be used only to scrutinize regulations 
that restrict commercial speech. 
Second, in its required disclosure jurisprudence, the Court has 
emphasized the significant differences between laws that restrict speech and 
laws that compel it when deciding what standard of scrutiny to employ.  
The Court cited this difference in Zauderer itself as one reason for 
establishing a standard independent of Central Hudson.349  And in Milavetz, 
the Court used the Zauderer standard because the challenged provision in 
that case imposed a disclosure requirement; it expressly noted that Central 
Hudson was inapplicable precisely because Central Hudson involved an 
affirmative limitation on commercial speech.350 
Although this second point is rooted in the Court’s rationale for applying 
Zauderer in disclosure cases, it also highlights that a challenged provision’s 
effect on commercial speech—that is, whether a law prohibits or forces 
commercial speech—is of crucial importance and must be taken into 
account.  Furthermore, it suggests that Central Hudson’s scope is limited to 
laws that dampen commercial speech, not to laws that compel it.  For these 
reasons, Central Hudson should not be used if Zauderer does not apply.351  
Accordingly, strict scrutiny must be used to assess the warning labels’ First 
Amendment fitness. 
Strict scrutiny should apply not only because of deductive logic, but also 
because the Court’s compelled speech doctrine requires it.  This doctrine, 
exemplified by Barnette, Wooley, and Pacific Gas & Electric Co., declares 
that the state cannot force private individuals and corporations to express 
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views that are repugnant to them unless the government can satisfy strict 
scrutiny review.352 
Given that the TCA labeling provision compels speech in the commercial 
context, the compelled speech doctrine should be used to analyze its 
constitutionality.  Furthermore, the issue addressed in Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co.—the constitutionality of a government regulation that 
compelled a private company to voice the message of a third party with 
which it disagreed—is identical to the controversy sparked by TCA’s 
labeling provision.353  Therefore, just as the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. 
District held, courts should apply the compelled speech doctrine unless the 
Zauderer exception requires rational basis review. 
B.  Applying the Framework:  The Labels Do Not Fall Within Zauderer’s 
Ambit, Strict Scrutiny Applies, and the Labels Fail Under It 
The previous section determined the appropriate framework for 
examining the labels’ constitutionality.  This section first applies this 
structure to the labels and determines that Zauderer does not apply.  It then 
analyzes the labels under strict scrutiny and concludes that they do not pass 
muster under this heightened form of review. 
1.  Zauderer Does Not Apply 
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the labels should be 
assessed under the Zauderer standard.  This Note concludes that Zauderer 
is inapplicable for three reasons. 
First, Zauderer applies only under narrow circumstances.  For Zauderer 
to govern, the compelled commercial disclosure must consist of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information” aimed to protect consumers from 
“confusion or deception” that is not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”354  
Thus, the disclosure requirement in question must be “reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”355  Rather than 
preventing deception, the government’s stated interest in promulgating the 
new graphic labels is to warn consumers about the dangers of smoking and 
to decrease smoking rates.356  Moreover, the government’s inclusion of the 
1-800-QUIT-NOW number indicates that the purpose of the labels is not to 
prevent deception but is instead to advocate an antismoking message.  Thus, 
while commendable as a public health strategy, the warning labels’ goals 
differ significantly from the interest required to trigger the Zauderer 
standard. 
 
 352. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 353. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 354. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 355. Id. 
 356. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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Second, even if the government’s interest in promulgating the graphic 
labels were to prevent consumer deception, the graphic labels are not 
“reasonably related” to this interest.  In Zauderer and Milavetz, the 
Supreme Court upheld provisions that required disclaimers that, if absent, 
would lead to almost certain deception and confusion in the marketplace.357  
The graphic warnings labels are distinguishable from those disclaimers 
because there is nothing inherently misleading about a cigarette package 
without an additional graphic warning label.  Cigarette packages already 
possess textual warnings that convey factual information about smoking’s 
dangers,358 and the absence of a graphical element does not alter this.  The 
disclaimers at issue in Zauderer, Ibanez, Milavetz, and Blagojevich all 
aimed to correct present and immediate deception, not past corporate 
deception.  Thus, although the argument that the graphic labels correct the 
tobacco industry’s history of deception is a compelling one, it does not fit 
within the narrow confines of Zauderer’s applicability.  Also, evidence that 
indicates that consumers do not read the current cigarette warnings does not 
mean that cigarette packages are therefore deceptive or misleading, merely 
that the current labels are ineffective.359 
Third, the images chosen by the FDA do not necessarily convey “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information” as required for a disclosure to be 
governed by Zauderer.360  Rather, the FDA selected the nine images 
specifically to shock and provoke emotions like depression, 
discouragement, and fear.361  Of course, the boundary between fact and 
emotion is not a clear one.  The presentation of facts often spurs emotion, 
and vice versa.  To fall within Zauderer’s ambit, a disclosure must impart 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.”362  The FDA’s chosen 
images,363 in contrast, have the potential to be controversial and misleading.  
Consider, for example, the photograph of a crying woman, which is coupled 
with the phrase “Warning:  Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in 
nonsmokers.”364  It has been proven that tobacco smoke leads to lung 
disease in nonsmokers,365 and the textual warning that accompanies the 
graphic image imparts this fact to the reader.  The connection between the 
photo of the distraught woman and the consequences of second-hand smoke 
are not at all clear, especially when viewed without the accompanying 
textual component.  This is problematic, as one of the major reasons for 
introducing the new graphic labels is to address the documented inadequacy 
 
 357. See supra notes 189, 215 and accompanying text. 
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 360. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 361. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the survey employed by the 
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defined in part as causing viewers to feel “depressed,” “discouraged,” or “afraid”). 
 362. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). 
 363. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the nine warning images 
chosen by the FDA). 
 364. See supra notes 69, 79 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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of the current labeling regime, which requires college-level readings skills 
to be understood.366  Many of the other images are similarly controversial 
and misleading.367  Taken together, the images cannot be said to impart 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.”  For these reasons, the 
warning labels do not fall within the Zauderer exception and therefore strict 
scrutiny should apply. 
2.  The Labels Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny and 
Are Thus Unconstitutional 
Because Zauderer does not apply in this situation, strict scrutiny must be 
used to analyze the labels.  To survive strict scrutiny, the government must 
(1) show a compelling interest, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote 
that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is 
available.368  The D.C. District Court’s application of this standard is 
reasonable and should be adopted. 
As discussed previously, the D.C. District Court determined that the TCA 
labels fail each of the three elements of strict scrutiny.369  First, although 
the government’s stated interest in educating consumers about the dangers 
of smoking may be compelling, its actual interest in advocating that the 
public not purchase cigarettes is not.370  Cigarettes are legal products, and 
the TCA itself forbids the FDA from banning their sale or mandating the 
elimination of nicotine from them.371 
Second, the labels are not narrowly tailored because their size and display 
requirements turn cigarette packages into a “mini-billboard” for the 
government’s antismoking agenda.372  The graphic warnings are thus 
similar to the four square inch sticker struck down in Blagojevich, which 
“literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored” because the sticker covered a 
substantial portion of the box.373 
Finally, five less burdensome and less restrictive alternatives are 
available to the government.374  These alternatives include the government 
disseminating its antismoking message itself by increasing its antismoking 
advertisements and issuing additional statements in the press urging 
consumers to quit smoking.375  These options alone burden and restrict First 
Amendment rights less than forcing the tobacco companies to advocate 
against their economic interests through the graphic labeling regime.  
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Consequently, the labels fail this part of the strict scrutiny test.  For these 
reasons, the graphic labels do not survive strict scrutiny and are thus 
unconstitutional compulsions of commercial speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Cigarette smoking is one of the deadliest and costliest public health crises 
in the United States, a fact exacerbated by the tobacco industry’s financial 
might and history of consumer deception.  Because of this, the American 
public is entitled to factually accurate information about the health 
consequences of smoking.  For these reasons, it may be hard to accept this 
Note’s conclusions regarding the application of the law.  Nevertheless, the 
government’s means of warning the public of smoking’s dangers and 
encouraging Americans not to smoke must be balanced with respect for the 
fundamental freedoms protected by the First Amendment.  Consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, this Note supports an analytical framework that 
subjects the labels to strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies. 
Using this framework, the graphic labels do not fall within the Zauderer 
exception, and they must be examined under strict scrutiny.  The labels fail 
to meet this standard because the government’s interest is not compelling, 
the labels are not narrowly tailored, and less burdensome restrictions are 
available.  Consequently, the TCA’s graphic cigarette warning labels are 
unconstitutional compulsions of commercial speech. 
